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Death Penalty
by Josh D. Moore*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Georgia Supreme Court addressed two death sentences on direct
appeal in this survey period,' affirming both of them, and addressed
four more death penalty cases at various stages of collateral review,
leaving death sentences intact in all but one case. Claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel frequently dominated the court's discussion of these
cases, playing a central role in all but two of them. The court, however,
also addressed some important issues touching on mental-health
evaluations and evidence, lethal injection, death qualification, and
victim-impact testimony.
II.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The court dealt with ineffective assistance of counsel claims in four
different death penalty cases. Lower courts had actually granted relief
on this ground in three out of the four cases: State v. Worsley, Humphrey
v. Nance, and Humphrey v. Walker. Of these three cases, the court
ultimately affirmed the lower court's judgment only in Walker and
reversed in both Nance and Worsley, reinstating the death sentences. 2
In the fourth case, Sears v. Humphrey, the state habeas court denied
relief twice, both prior and subsequent to a remand from the United

* Appellate Director, Capital Defender Division of the Georgia Public Defender
Standards Council. University of Michigan (K-B., 1991); Harvard Law School (J.D., 1995).
1. For an analysis of Georgia death penalty law during the prior survey period, see
Josh D. Moore, Death Penalty, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L. REV. 93
(2013).

2.

See Humphrey v. Walker, 294 Ga. 855, 855, 757 S.E.2d 68, 71 (2014); State v.

Worsley, 293 Ga. 315, 316, 745 S.E.2d 617, 619 (2013); Humphrey v. Nance, 293 Ga. 189,
191, 744 S.E.2d 706, 710 (2013).
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States Supreme Court in 2010,' and the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed.4
The Failureto PresentAll Available Mitigation Evidence
After the Georgia Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from the
denial of Demarcus Sears's state habeas petition, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2010 and remanded the case by a
five-vote per curiam opinion, concluding that the state habeas court had
erroneously "determined it could not speculate as to what the effect of
additional evidence would have been" because "Sears' counsel did present
some mitigation evidence during Sears' penalty phase." The crux of the
Court's 2010 holding in Sears v. Upton6 can be fairly summarized as
follows: "We certainly have never held that counsel's effort to present
some mitigation evidence should foreclose an inquiry into whether a
facially deficient mitigation investigation might have prejudiced the
defendant."7
This observation set the stage for several opinions this year from the
Georgia Supreme Court, including Sears v. Humphrey,8 grappling with
the question of how to properly analyze ineffective assistance of counsel
claims where some, or even a substantial amount of, mitigation evidence
was actually presented at trial.' The court's clearest articulation of its
position on this important question came in Humphrey v. Nance,"°
where it held, "Trial counsel are not constitutionally deficient as a
matter of law simply because they do not present all reasonably
available mitigating evidence, even if the omitted evidence is consistent
with their chosen strategy."" The court echoed this conclusion in State
v. Worsley,' 2 observing simply that "counsel is not required to present
all mitigating evidence.""
Though there is nothing irreconcilable between the United States
Supreme Court's holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
may not be rejected purely based on the fact that some mitigation
evidence was presented at trial and the Georgia Supreme Court's

A.

3. See Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 946 (2010).
4. Sears v. Humphrey, 294 Ga. 117, 117-18, 751 S.E.2d 365, 368 (2013).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Upton, 561 U.S. at 946.
561 U.S. 945 (2010).
Id. at 955.
294 Ga. 117, 751 S.E.2d 365 (2013).
See, e.g., id.; Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 744 S.E.2d 706.
293 Ga. 189, 744 S.E.2d 706 (2013).
Id. at 192, 744 S.E.2d at 711 (emphasis added).
293 Ga. 315, 745 S.E.2d 617 (2013).
Id. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 626.
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holding that such a claim is not guaranteed to succeed based purely on
the fact that some available mitigation evidence was omitted, a decided
tension nonetheless begins to emerge in the treatment of these claims. 14
This tension appears to manifest itself most clearly in the way the two
different courts value or dismiss new mitigation evidence developed after
trial, a difference of approach perhaps best illustrated by contrasting the
United States Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in Upton with Justice
Scalia's derisive dissent.' 5
B.

Competing Theories of Mitigation
In Sears, the Georgia Supreme Court hews very closely to Justice
Scalia's dissent in Upton,' where Justice Scalia dismissed much of the
new evidence Sears presented as 'Incredible" and "sill[y]," ultimately
concluding that "it is impossible to say that substituting the 'deprivedchildhood-cum-brain-damage' defense for the 'good-middle-class-kid-whomade-a-mistake' defense would probably have produced a different
verdict."
The Georgia Supreme Court appears to share Justice
Scalia's deep skepticism about the comparative efficacy of this former
class of evidence, and this skepticism is clearly reflected in the court's
holdings in both Sears and Nance. 8
In Sears, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the notion
that proof of brain damage and drug use might have affected the result
of the trial, concluding that "a reasonable jury could have viewed
evidence that Sears suffers from frontal lobe damage as aggravating"
and that expert testimony about the possible long-term effects of drug
abuse was "a factor that a reasonable jury could consider aggravating."' 9 The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, looking
at more-or-less the same record, had previously observed that "[ciompetent counsel should have been able to turn some of the adverse evidence
into a positive-perhaps in support of a cognitive deficiency mitigation
theory." 0 In other words, one gets the sense that these two courts are
able to look at a single set of facts and circumstances and see two
radically different pictures.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
706.
19.
20.

See generally Upton, 561 U.S. 945; Worsley, 293 Ga. 315, 745 S.E.2d 617.
See Upton, 561 U.S. at 951, 957 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Sears, 294 Ga. at 159-60, 751 S.E.2d at 395.
Upton, 561 U.S. at 964 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See generally Sears, 294 Ga. 117, 751 S.E.2d 365; Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 744 S.E.2d
Sears, 294 Ga. at 153, 155, 751 S.E.2d at 391, 393-94.
Upton, 561 U.S. at 951.
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The court in Sears also, and perhaps more significantly, faulted the
mitigation evidence presented by habeas counsel for being inconsistent
with the evidence presented at trial.2 1 This criticism also played an
important role in the court's opinions in Nance and, to a lesser extent,
in Worsley.22 In Nance, for example, the court observed that "evidence
of frontal lobe damage to explain Nance's behavior at the time of the
murder would have undermined their mitigation theory that he was a
changed man,"23 and the court in Worsley noted that "some of the [new]
"
testimony contradicted the testimony of [Worsley's expert at trial]. 24
These opinions reflect an unwillingness on the part of the Georgia
Supreme Court, one clearly shared by Justice Scalia, to fault trial
counsel for appearing to eschew one colorable mitigation theory in favor
This unwillingness appears to be particularly acute in
of another.'
cases where a "positive" mitigation theory was pursued, to one extent or
another, at trial-the "changed man" in Nance and the "good-middleclass-kid-who-made-a-mistake" in Humphrey-and evidence, such as
brain damage or trauma, is subsequently discovered or more fully
developed that would lend itself to painting a darker, and arguably more
frightening, picture of the defendant.26
C.

Deference to the Lower Courts on IAC

Humphrey v. Walker 27 represents the only case from this survey
period where the Georgia Supreme Court ultimately affirmed a lower
court's finding of ineffective assistance of counsel." The court concluded its analysis by explaining,
In the light of the factual findings of the habeas court - to which we
must defer, insofar as they have some evidentiary support - ] we
cannot say that the habeas court erred when it determined that Walker

21. Sears, 294 Ga. at 156-59, 751 S.E.2d at 393-95.
22.

See Worsley, 293 Ga. at 327-28, 745 S.E.2d at 627; Nance, 293 Ga. at 214, 744

S.E.2d at 725.
23. Nance, 293 Ga. at 217, 744 S.E.2d at 727.
24.
25.

Worsley, 293 Ga. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 626.
See generally Upton, 561 U.S. at 957-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Sears, 294 Ga. 117,

751 S.E.2d 365; Worsley, 293 Ga. 315, 745 S.E.2d 617; Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 744 S.E.2d 706.
26. See Sears,294 Ga. at 129-30, 751 S.E.2d at 376; Nance, 293 Ga. at 205, 744 S.E.2d
at 719; but see Perkins v. Hall, 288 Ga. 810, 817-19, 708 S.E.2d 335, 343-44 (2011) (relying
on new evidence of trauma and brain damage to reverse a habeas court's rejection of an
ineffective assistance claim at sentencing).
27. 294 Ga. 855, 757 S.E.2d 68 (2014).
28. Id. at 860-61, 876, 757 S.E.2d at 74, 84.
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was denied the effective assistance of counsel with respect to an
investigation and evaluation of his competence.29
Although this language is consistent with the court's oft-repeated
characterization of its proper role as "accept[ing] the habeas court's
factual findings unless clearly erroneous" while "independently
apply[ing] the legal principles to the facts,"3 the court, nonetheless,
appears to have extended somewhat more deference in Walker than in
other cases. For example, in weighing the persuasiveness of Walker's
mental-health evidence, the court made the following observation: 'The
habeas court was in the best position to assess the credibility of [the
psychologist], and it obviously found him quite credible."3 '
Such
statements are nowhere to be found in the court's discussion of the
witnesses presented after trial in Nance or Worsley.3 2
In Sears, the court quoted its recent opinion in Humphrey v. Morrow33 for the seemingly straightforward proposition that "our assessment of how a jury might have reacted to the additional evidence that
[Sears] has presented in the habeas court is an assessment of the legal
question of prejudice, which we perform de novo." 4 The court clarified
this principle by explaining that it means the court "must conduct [its]
own reweighing of the mitigating and aggravating evidence."3 5 This
particular "reweighing" requirement arguably did not apply in Walker,
where the question was framed not by the jury's determination of
penalty, but rather by the question of competency to stand trial.36
As discussed earlier,37 a deep skepticism for the efficacy of certain
types of "double-edged" mitigation evidence, especially in conjunction
with an inversely high value placed on the aggravating factors present,
has seemed to drive the court's analysis of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims focused on the sentencing phase of death penalty

29. Id. at 874, 757 S.E.2d at 83.
30. Sears, 294 Ga. at 122, 751 S.E.2d at 371.
31. Walker, 294 Ga. at 876, 757 S.E.2d at 84.
32. See generally Worsley, 293 Ga. 315, 745 S.E.2d 617; Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 744 S.E.2d
706.
33. 289 Ga. 864, 717 S.E.2d 168 (2011).
34. Sears, 294 Ga. at 137, 751 S.E.2d at 381 (alteration in original) (quoting Morrow,
289 Ga. at 870, 717 S.E.2d at 175).
35. Id. at 122, 751 S.E.2d at 371 (emphasis added).
36. See Walker, 294 Ga. at 857-58, 757 S.E.2d at 72; see also Perkins, 288 Ga. at 823,
708 S.E.2d at 34647 (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim focused on
competency but granting relief for ineffective assistance at sentencing).
37. See infra Part Il.B.
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trials.38 In both Nance and Worsley, the court ultimately substituted
its own judgment for that of the lower courts, which actually heard the
evidence at issue.3 9 Because the question of "how a jury might have
reacted to the additional evidence" has been characterized as a pure
conclusion of law, this substitution of judgment need not be justified by
a finding of either clear error or abuse of discretion. 0
The painstaking factual development of these lengthy opinions reveals
that the court has taken its task seriously, but the court has never
waivered from its position that the conclusions of a lower court on the
question of prejudice at sentencing, or, to put it another way, on the
"impactfulness" of new mitigation evidence, are due no deference on
appeal."' This approach has resulted in a trend, noted even among
observers outside the legal community, of reinstating death sentences
where lower reviewing courts have reversed them on the grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.42 The court's opinions
in Nance and Worsley continue that trend.'
D. Silent or Ambiguous Record on Ineffective Assistance
In Worsley, the court reminded litigants of yet another potential pitfall
in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, namely that "a silent or
ambiguous record is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of
reasonable performance, and it is Appellee's burden to make a complete
and clear record." The court observed, in this regard, that only one
of Worsley's trial lawyers was called by the appellee at the motion for
new trial, "so the record is altogether silent about what the other trial
counsel knew and did not know." Regarding the trial counsel who did
testify, the court noted that the "Appellee never asked him what he

38. See, e.g., Sears, 294 Ga. at 149, 751 S.E.2d at 388 (finding no prejudice in failure
to present evidence of brain impairment based on "the following reasons: (1) the weakness

of much of the evidence upon which Sears' mental health experts relied to support their
testimony and diagnoses; (2)the aggravating potential of this evidence; (3) the testimony's
inconsistency with the evidence at trial; and (4) the strength of the aggravating
circumstances in Sears' case.").
39. See generally Worsley, 293 Ga. 315, 745 S.E.2d 617; Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 744 S.E.2d
706.
40. Sears, 294 Ga. at 137, 751 S.E.2d at 381 (quoting Morrow, 289 Ga. at 870, 717
S.E.2d at 175).
41. See, e.g., id.
42. See Bill Rankin, Crime and Punishment; High Court Tends to Back Death
Sentences, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 2, 2013,

at Al.

43. See generally Worsley, 293 Ga. at 315, 745 S.E.2d at 617; Nance, 293 Ga. at 189,
744 S.E.2d at 706.
44. Worsley, 293 Ga. at 325 n.10, 745 S.E.2d at 625 n.10.
45. Id.
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knew, and what he did not know, about the testimony that family
members might give."' Under these circumstances, the court found
"no evidence whatsoever that trial counsel was unaware of the testimony
that the
sisters or other family members were prepared to give at
47
trial."
III. LETHAL INJECTION
The near-universal unwillingness of major pharmaceutical companies
to provide medications for use in executions has led to a national
shortage of lethal-injection drugs that, in turn, has created great
difficulties for states like Georgia that would attempt to carry out these
sentences.' As a consequence of this dilemma, not a single execution
was carried out during this survey period.4"
In Owens v. Hill,5" the court addressed the constitutionality of section
42-5-36(d)(2) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 1 a
new statutory provision that categorically prevents disclosure of, among
other things, "identifying information ...of any person or entity that
manufactures, supplies, compounds, or prescribes the drugs, medical
supplies, 5or2 medical equipment utilized in the execution of a death
sentence."
Many states, including Georgia, have been forced to turn to compounding pharmacies to supply the necessary drugs for lethal injection as a
result of the pharmaceutical companies' refusal to provide them.5 3 The
dispute in Hill was framed by the State's refusal to comply with a

46. Id.
47. Id. In this same vein, the court rejected the claim that Worsley's trial counsel were
ineffective "for their failure to speak with any of Appellee's schoolteachers" on the grounds
that "no schoolteacher testified at the motion for new trial. So, even if the failure to speak
with a schoolteacher was unreasonable, Appellee cannot show any prejudice whatsoever
as a result of that failure." Id. at 328 n.12, 745 S.E.2d at 627 n.12.
48. See Ed Pilkington, Georgia rushes through executions before lethal injection drugs
expire, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/21/ge
orgia-executions-lethal-injection-drug-pentobarbital.
49. The survey period is from June 1, 2013 to May 31, 2014. Andrew Cook was
executed on February 21, 2013, and Marcus Wellons was executed on June 17, 2014.
U.S.A. Executions-1977-Present:Georgia,DEATH PENALTY USA, http'J/deathpenaltyusa.org
/usa/state/georgia.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
50. 295 Ga. 302, 758 S.E.2d 794 (2014).
51. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(dX2) (2014).
52. Id.; see also Hill, 295 Ga. at 302, 758 S.E.2d at 796 (holding that maintaining "the
confidentiality of... identifmg information of the persons ... involved in executions" is
not unconstitutional).
53. Compounding Pharmaciesand Lethal Injections, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/compounding-pharmacies (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
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demand for "[slealed discovery of the identity of the compounding
pharmacy and the supply chain and manufacturer(s) of any and all
ingredients used to produce the lethal drug compound to be injected into
Warren Hill. " "' Hill argued that such disclosure was necessary to
make a showing of "substantial risk of serious harm" pursuant to Baze
v. Rees,55 and the lower court granted him injunctive relief.6
After dealing with numerous jurisdictional issues that are not specific
to the death penalty, the court was ultimately left unimpressed by Hill's
prospects of success on his Eighth Amendment claim under Baze.57
The following passage from the majority opinion best encapsulates the
court's overall perspective on the confidentiality statute at issue:
We are mindful of Hill's argument about enhancing the public debate
on the death penalty in general and on the participation of specific
persons and entities in executions in particular, and we recognize that
disclosing the compounding pharmacy that produces lethal injection
drugs might enhance the ability of Hill and the general public to more
fully satisfy themselves that Georgia's method of execution is humane.
However, we conclude that Georgia's execution process is likely made
more timely and orderly by the execution-participant confidentiality
statute and, furthermore, that significant personal interests are also
protected by it. Accordingly, we also conclude that it therefore, on
balance, plays a positive role in the functioning of the capital punishment process.5"
Justice Benham, writing for the two-vote dissent, explained,
I write because I fear this State is on a path that, at the very least,
denies Hill and other death row inmates their rights to due process
and, at the very worst, leads to the macabre results that occurred in
Oklahoma. There must be certainty in the administration of the death
penalty. 9

54. Hill, 295 Ga. at 303, 758 S.E.2d at 797.
55. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842
(1994)).
56. Hill, 295 Ga. at 302, 309, 312, 758 S.E.2d at 796, 801, 802-03 (quoting Baze, 553
U.S. at 50).
57. Id. at 307, 312, 758 S.E.2d at 799, 802-03.
58. Id. at 317, 758 S.E.2d at 806.
59. Id. at 318, 758 S.E.2d at 806-07 (Benham, J., dissenting). Justice Benham
describes the Oklahoma incident at the beginning of his opinion. Id.
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IV. REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATIONS
The defendants in both Sears v. Humphrey and Humphrey v. Walker
refused to submit to pretrial mental health evaluations,"0 a phenomenon perhaps not so rare as an outside observer might suspect. In Sears,
the fact that "[b]oth attorneys testified that, after consulting with
counsel, it was Sears' choice not to be evaluated" clearly played a role in
the court's determination that counsel were not ineffective for failing to
have him evaluated by a mental health expert.6 ' In this regard, the
court cited Strickland v. Washington62 for the proposition "that it is
proper for counsel to base their actions on 'informed strategic choices
made by the defendant."' 3
Although the court in Walker did not necessarily fault counsel for
failing to override their client's refusal to submit to an evaluation, it did,
nonetheless, conclude that "a reasonable lawyer would not have
abandoned the pursuit so quickly, just because Walker was opposed to
the development of evidence of his mental health." 4 Unlike Sears,
where the court observed that "without any indication that [Sears] was
suffering from any significant, noticeable disorder, trial counsel made a
reasonable strategic decision not to have him evaluated by a mental
health expert," 5 the court in Walker found that "each lawyer had good
reasons to be concerned about the competence of their client, and each
lawyer, in fact, had such concerns.
Another significant distinction between Sears and Walker is that,
unlike trial counsel in Sears, Walker's trial counsel had retained the
services of a psychologist prior to trial. The problem, however, was that
they neglected to consult with him after their client refused to submit to
an evaluation."
Here, the court concluded, lay the flaw in their
representation, namely their complete failure to explore "feasible
alternatives to a personal examination. "6S The court stated, 'If counsel
had so consulted with the psychologist, they would have learned that he

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Walker, 294 Ga. at 861, 757 S.E.2d at 74; Sears, 294 Ga. at 128, 751 S.E.2d at 375.
Sears, 294 Ga. at 129-30, 751 S.E.2d at 376.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Sears, 294 Ga. at 129, 751 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).
Walker, 294 Ga. at 874, 757 S.E.2d at 83.
Sears, 294 Ga. at 130, 751 S.E.2d at 376 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Walker, 294 Ga. at 862, 757 S.E.2d at 75.
Id. at 861, 757 S.E.2d at 74.
Id.
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could render an opinion about the mental health of their client even
without Walker submitting to an examination."6 9
Perhaps the most salient point to emerge from the court's opinion in
Walker, however, relates not to the complex duties and responsibilities
of counsel in cases where clients refuse to be evaluated by a mental
health expert, but rather to the broader question of the admissibility of
in a case where the defendant is not
mental-health expert testimony
"personally" evaluated.7 ° The position taken by the warden in Walker
was that the expert testimony admitted in the habeas court would have
been inadmissible in the trial court "to the extent that Walker refused
to submit to an examination by an expert for the State."7 ' The court,
however, rejected this contention, explaining that
the disallowance of such testimony seems mostly justified by notions
of a level playing field, that is, the idea that the accused ought not be
permitted to offer expert testimony based upon his own (possibly selfserving) statements and, at the same time,
72 deny the State a fair
opportunity to challenge those statements.
Since the defense expert "based his opinions principally on the
observations of Walker by third parties, to whom the State had access,"
the court held that his testimony "would not have been inadmissible in
a competence trial simply because Walker would not submit to an
examination."73 In so holding, the court explicitly left unresolved the
question of whether such expert testimony would be permissible "in the
guilt-innocence or sentencing phases of trial."74 This unresolved
question could prove to be a very important one in the future.
V. DEATH PENALTY FOR NON-HoMICIDE OFFENSES
In Sears v. Humphrey, because his victim was killed not in Georgia
but in Kentucky, Demarcus Sears was sentenced to die for the crime of
kidnaping, which, the court explained in a footnote, is apparently
permitted by O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(2)75 when the crime "was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of the capital
felon[y] of murder." 6 The United States Supreme Court likewise
69. Id.
70. See id. at 873-74, 757 S.E.2d at 82-83.
71. Id. at 873, 757 S.E.2d at 82.
72. Id. at 873-74, 757 S.E.2d at 82.
73. Id. at 874, 757 S.E.2d at 83 (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(2) (2013).
76. Sears, 294 Ga. at 117 & n.1, 757 S.E.2d at 368 & n.1 (alteration in original)
(quoting Potts v. State, 261 Ga. 716, 720,410 S.E.2d 89,93 (1991)); see also O.C.G.A. § 17-
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referred to this issue only in a footnote in Sears v. Upton, observing that
"Sears has raised a categorical Eighth Amendment challenge to the
constitutionality of his death sentence for a kidnaping offense, which we
decline to reach. And any jurisdictional or constitutional issue with
respect to Georgia's ability to execute Sears for a murder occurring in
Kentucky is not before us.""
Many observers have assumed that the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Kennedy v. Louisiana78 put an end to the death penalty for
non-homicide offenses.79 It would appear, however, that this remains
to be seen. In Sears, the court cited its previous opinions-Potts v.
State ° and Stanley v. State8 1-in support of the contention that the
death penalty remains permissible for this particular non-homicide
offense. 2 Both of these cases, however, predate the announcement of the
holding in Kennedy by more than a decade, and neither involved
situations where the murder occurred outside the state of Georgia. 83
VI.

DEATH QUALIFICATION

State, 4

In Edenfield v.
a difficult question relating to "case specific"
death qualification of jurors split the court.8" The opinion provides an
informative glimpse into the way the court will apply the important
principles it articulated in Ellington v. State," a 2012 decision.87 On
appeal, Edenfield claimed "that the trial court erred when it refused to
strike a prospective juror who said in voir dire that he 'couldn't consider
the possibility of parole' for someone convicted of the murder if the
murder involved the 'sexual abuse [of] a child.'" 8 Since the facts of the

10-30(b)(2).
77. Upton, 561 U.S. at 947 n.2.

78. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
79. See id. at 413 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of "the death

penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to
result,
80.
81.
82.
S.E.2d
83.
173.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

in death of the victim").
261 Ga. 716, 410 S.E.2d 89 (1991).
240 Ga. 341, 241 S.E.2d 173 (1977).
Sears, 294 Ga. at 117 n.1, 757 S.E.2d at 368 n.1; see also Potts, 261 Ga. at 720, 410
at 93-94; Stanley, 240 Ga. at 350, 241 S.E.2d at 179.
See generally Potts, 261 Ga. 716, 410 S.E.2d 89; Stanley, 240 Ga. 341, 241 S.E.2d
293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (2013).
Id. at 393, 744 S.E.2d at 757.
292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012).
See Edenfield, 293 Ga. at 376-93, 744 S.E.2d at 746-57.
Id. at 379, 744 S.E.2d at 748 (alteration in original).
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case did involve the brutal rape, torture, and eventual murder of a sixyear-old child, Edenfield contended that he was entitled to a reversal.8 9
The court commenced its discussion by observing, "If that were all the
prospective juror had said, perhaps Edenfield might be right."'
According to the court, however, the prospective juror "said a great deal
more in his voir dire, and based on all that he said, the trial judge found
that he was qualified."' The relevant exchange between the juror and
the trial judge is reproduced in its entirety in the opinion, but can be
fairly summarized as follows: When asked by the trial court if he could
consider all three of the punishments at issue, the potential juror
responded,
I, I could consider them[,] but if, if, if it turns out that the person had
been convicted of a case where he had, was guilty of sexual abuse [of]
a child[,] then I certainly wouldn't, wouldn't ever allow, I couldn't
consider the possibility of parole because it could happen again. I, and
IAt this point, the trial judge stepped in, stating, "It would be fact driven.
and the potential juror agreed
It would be depending upon
9 2 the facts-,"
that it "absolutely" would.
Although conceding that the "rehabilitation" questioning in this case
"did not explicitly reference [the juror's] earlier statement that he could
not consider parole if a child was murdered and sexually abused," a
majority of the court was ultimately "satisfied that the trial court in this
case might reasonably have concluded that it did [relate back to the
juror's statement] ." 3 The two-vote dissent, on the other hand, would
have held that "[t]he juror never once gave a response that retreated
from his initial, firm position regarding the possibility of parole for cases
involving child molestation."94
The entire court, in other words, seems to accept the proposition that
a potential juror who would categorically refuse to consider the
possibility of parole for a defendant convicted in a case where a child
was murdered and sexually abused would not have been qualified to
serve on this trial.9 5 The disagreement between the majority and

89. Id. at 370, 744 S.E.2d at 742.

90. Id. at 379, 744 S.E.2d at 748.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 381, 744 S.E.2d at 749 (alteration in original).
93. Id. at 386-87, 744 S.E.2d at 752-53 (emphasis added).

94. Id. at 395, 744 S.E.2d at 758 (Thompson, P.J., dissenting).
95. The majority suggested in a footnote that a potential juror's "predisposition against
parole may not have the same implications under" the post-2009 sentencing statutes. Id.
at 379 n.13, 744 S.E.2d at 748 n.13 (majority opinion). However, it is difficult to see why
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dissent was over whether the record clearly established that this
particular juror held such an emphatic view." In this regard, the
majority opinion includes the observation that "although the potential
juror spoke the word 'certainly,' he also appears to have stammered as
he spoke, which suggests, if anything, uncertainty and hesitation."9"
The majority further elaborated that "[aippellate judges, after all, have
only a cold record from which to size up a prospective juror, and they are
in no position to assess whether a prospective juror spoke with
assurance or uncertainty, enthusiasm or hesitation, candor or guile."9
The court's ultimate conclusion, that the "ambiguity" of this record gave
rise to a situation where "reasonable people" might "reasonably disagree
about what is to be done" and that "the discretion here belongs to the
trial court,"9 9 is likely a good predictor of the court's general conceptual
approach to this issue in the future.
VII. VICTIM IMPACT
In addition to perceived deficiencies in the presentation of mitigation
evidence, the lower court in State v. Worsley also based its decision to
grant a new trial on trial counsel's failure to object to improper victim
impact testimony. The victim's mother and sister testified, without
objection, that Worsley deserved the "maximum" and "ultimate" sentence
for his crime."
The supreme court agreed that these comments
violated "settled law that testimony by relatives of a victim concerning
the appropriate sentence is not properly admissible in a death penalty
case," but
it found no legal prejudice and therefore reversed the lower
101
court.
The court based its conclusion that the admission of this improper
victim impact sentence did not give rise to "a reasonable likelihood...
that the outcome of the sentencing phase would have been different" on

this would be so since O.C.G.A § 17-10-31 currently provides that "where a statutory
circumstance is found but a recommendation of death is not made, the jury shall decide
whether to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole." O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31 (2013) (emphasis added).
96. See generally Edenfleld, 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738. The dissent would have
found that the trial judge "was operating under the mistaken belief that [the juror's
unwillingness to consider parole] was not disqualifying because the particular fact' of child

molestation had not yet been proven through the evidence." Id. at 395, 744 S.E.2d at 758
(Thompson, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 381 n.14, 744 S.E.2d at 749 n.14 (majority opinion).

98. Id. at 379, 744 S.E.2d at 748.
99. Id. at 387-88, 744 S.E.2d at 753.
100. Worsley, 293 Ga. at 328, 745 S.E.2d at 627.
101. Id. at 328, 329, 745 S.E.2d at 627, 628.
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the following five factors: (1) "the statements were only implied requests
for the jury to recommend the death penalty;" (2) "the jury likely could
have inferred that the testifying witnesses supported the decision of the
State to seek the death penalty simply from the fact that the witnesses
appeared in the sentencing phase to give victim-impact testimony;" (3)
"the statements, though improper, did not consist of especially heated
rhetoric and do not appear to have been especially inflammatory;" (4)
"the improper statements were only a small part of victim-impact
testimony that was, for the most part, properly admissible;" and (5) "the
case for death was a strong one."' °2 Had this issue been preserved by
objection at trial, in contrast, the State would have needed to establish
that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" to prevail.'
VIII.

IMPROPER SENTENCING ARGUMENT

In Edenfield v. State, Edenfield complained in his direct appeal that
reversible error had occurred when the prosecutor referred to him as an
"animal" in closing argument at the sentencing phase.'0 4
When
his
"withdrew
defense counsel objected to this argument, the prosecutor
the
trial
and
it,"
remark and apologized to the jury for having made
judge instructed the jurors to "disregard it entirely."0 5 The court
rejected this issue as a basis for reversing Edenfield's death sentence on
appeal, explaining, "We have held that characterizing a defendant in
closing arguments as an 'animal' is 'unnecessary and undesirable,' but
we also10 6have held that allowing such a remark is not always reversible
error."
IX.

INTERIM REVIEW

Edenfield also complained that the trial court had committed error by
0 7
The
refusing to certify legal issues in his case for interim review.'
court dismissed this claim by explaining that a trial court's refusal to
grant interim review is, by statute, not appealable, "[aind in any event,
Edenfield can show no harm from the denial of leave to seek interim
review because he is free in this appeal to raise any issues that he might
8
properly have raised in an application for interim review."

102. Id. at 328-29, 745 S.E.2d at 627-28.
103. Id. at 329, 745 S.E.2d at 628; see also Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 898, 708
S.E.2d 362, 383 (2011).
104. 293 Ga. at 391-92, 744 S.E.2d at 756.
105. Id. at 391, 744 S.E.2d at 756.
106. Id. at 391-92, 744 S.E.2d at 756.
107. Id. at 376, 744 S.E.2d at 746.
108. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35.2 (2013).

